

## HEATHROW AIRPORT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

### Minutes of meeting held on 27<sup>th</sup> September 2006 at Heathrow Point West

#### PRESENT:

Sam Jones, Chairman	-	HACC
Maurice Hudson, Technical Adviser	-	HACC
Carole Havercroft, Secretary	-	HACC
Cllr. Chris Turrell	-	Bracknell Forest BC
Cllr. Ian Potts	-	LB Ealing
Cllr. David Bishop	-	LB Hillingdon
Cllr. Graham Horn	-	LB Hillingdon
Cllr. Ruth Cadbury	-	LB Hounslow
Cllr. Martin Elengorn	-	LB Richmond upon Thames
Cllr. Patrick Roberts	-	Runnymede BC
Cllr. Gerry Ceaser	-	Spelthorne BC
Cllr. Denise Grant	-	Spelthorne BC
Cllr. Malcolm Beer	-	RB Windsor & Maidenhead
Cllr. Cynthia Endacott (Deputy)	-	RB Windsor & Maidenhead
Susan Parsons	-	ABTA
Margaret Majumdar	-	EANAG
Gareth Harper (Deputy)	-	HACAN/Clearskies
Rob Gibson	-	LAANC
Philip Carlisle	-	GTMC
John Gurney	-	TUC
Iain Hope	-	LCCI
Roger Wiltshire	-	BATA
Paul Ellis	-	IATA
Lynette Braithwaite	-	AUC
Frank Wingate	-	Future Heathrow
Geoff Pope	-	London Assembly
Brian Yates	-	Consumers' Association
Andy Hull	-	Independent
Keith Harlow	-	Independent
Colin Mitchell	-	Independent
Susan Laurie	-	Independent
Mako Mochizuki	-	Independent

#### OTHERS:

David Gray	-	Department for Transport
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#### HEATHROW AIRPORT LIMITED

Tony Douglas	-	Chief Executive Officer
Mike Forster	-	Business Strategy Director
Ben Morton	-	Director of Communications

## **APOLOGIES:**

### **1. Apologies for absence were received from the following:-**

Mick Temple (BAA), Tabitha Stebbings (BAA), Cllr. Nicholas Botterill (LB Hammersmith & Fulham), Cllr. Barbara Harris (Deputy) (LB Hounslow), Cllr. Shirley Fisher (LB Hounslow), Cllr. Mohammed Khursheed (LB Hillingdon), Cllr. John Oswell (Deputy) (LB Hillingdon), Cllr. Denise Saliagopoulos (Surrey County Council), Cllr. Dev Dhillon, (South Bucks DC), Cllr. Jim Maddan (LB Wandsworth), Virginia Godfrey (HACAN/Clearskies), Dr. Mike Walsh (Independent).

## **3065 MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING**

1. The Minutes of the meeting held on 26th July 2006 were agreed with the following amendments:-

Clarification to **Minute 3052 (2) Project for the Sustainable Development of Heathrow**, submitted by Mr. David Gray, Department for Transport.

The entire paragraph to be replaced with:-

*"More importantly, the Department had spoken to Professor Ian Poll from Cranfield University (who was a member of the peer review panel) and he had denied the remarks attributed to him in the newspaper report about either the merits or feasibility of further development at Heathrow, in the light of the technical work. The reality was that neither the technical report nor the peer review report attempted to draw any conclusions about whether or not a third runway would pass the air quality test."*

2. John Gurney referred to **Minute 3050 (7)** where it had been stated that 'the new Control Tower on Pier 6 at Terminal 3 had been short-listed for the 'British Construction Industry' Award. This should have read *Pier 7*.
3. Margaret Majumdar referred to **Minute 3051 (5)** where the comment had been made that 'the Committee were originally told last Autumn, when it had been announced that Terminal 2, would be re-developed. The question was asked what was proposed for Terminal 2'. This should have read *Terminal 1*.
4. Virginia Godfrey had requested that **Minute 3052 (4)** should be amended, where reference had been made 'to the original proposal of the year 2010 for a third runway'. This should have read '*to the original proposal of the year 2010 for meeting air quality limits*'.

## **3066 MATTERS ARISING**

1. The Chairman asked for feedback on matters arising from the meeting held on 26th July 2006.

(a) Cllr. Martin Elengorn – LB Richmond had posed the following question to BAA for response at the HACC meeting:-

Why was so little notice given of the proposed Eastern Apron development works starting on the 10th September and what benefits will there be to local communities?’

The Chairman stated that this matter would be covered under the report from BAA Management (**Minute 3068**).

2. (b) **Minute 3017** – Flight of Evergreen B747 into Heathrow – see Agenda Item 7.

There had been further considerable concern expressed by the Members at the July meeting, regarding the fact that a response had been received from the CAA, but that they were not prepared to address the Committee. Some Members had felt that the Authority had not done as much as they should.

However, the Civil Aviation Authority were rather constrained by the International Agreement on such matters and did not have total control over what they might perhaps think was necessary.

3. The Chairman commented that at the July meeting he had stated that a Sub-Committee meeting would be held to discuss the subject of the Environmental Noise European Directive which had been raised by Gareth Harper who represented HACAN/Clearskies. BAA had thought that until it had passed all the Parliamentary procedures, they would prefer to wait until a meeting was convened.

The Chairman had received a letter, again from Gareth Harper raising a major issue on noise contours.

It was therefore suggested that a Sub-Committee meeting be held to cover both of these issues in November 2006.

4. Cllr. Horn had raised the question of the possibility of extending the Metropolitan Line to Heathrow. The Chairman requested that an Officers’ Report should be submitted from the LB Hillingdon. This could then be put on an appropriate Agenda for a forthcoming HACC meeting. This was agreed.
5. John Gurney referred to **Minute 5059 (5)** where he had raised the question if the Cargo Tunnel was included in the BAA Capital Investment Plan for renovation.

Mike Forster confirmed that it was not included.

**3067 REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARIAT**

**3068 COMMENTARY FROM THE MANAGEMENT OF BAA HEATHROW**

1. Discussion on matters reported by BAA Heathrow management.  
The BAA Heathrow Update and Statistical Information had been circulated and was noted, as set out in paragraphs 2-11 below.

2. **Increased Security Alert**

Members will all be aware of the significant disruption Heathrow experienced to its operation following the increased security alert on 10 August 2006.

Check-in and hand search processes across all four Heathrow terminals were severely affected. This greatly intensified the demands made on security guards and other processes. Staff worked around the clock to ensure that systems were put in place to meet the threat, and hundreds of additional volunteers were drafted in.

BAA acutely regret the disruption the new arrangements caused to passengers and airlines. It was not believed that the criticism that they lacked adequate plans to deal with the emergency which was levelled by some airlines, was fair nor accurate.

BAA operates detailed contingency plans for many types of emergency and crisis management teams are routinely staffed jointly by airports and airlines. However, the scale and suddenness of the measures imposed could not be managed without significant disruption. No organisation can hold sufficient staff in reserve against such a significant and sustained increase of activity.

Conditions have now settled down at Heathrow although the current security regime, which must be assumed will be maintained for the foreseeable future, will require us to bring in additional staff and to strengthen other aspects of our security system. A programme of work to this effect has already begun.

3. **John Prescott Visit**

The Deputy Prime Minister visited Heathrow in August following the increased security threat. He praised employees for their “dedication and professionalism” in dealing with the resulting disruption.

4. **Security Alleviation Update**

On Thursday 22 September 2006, the DFT announced an alleviation in security measures. Passengers can now take one larger piece of hand luggage and solid cosmetics through security. Musicians can also take instruments through security but need to contact their airlines in advance.

These new measures have been clearly communicated and implemented throughout Heathrow.

5. **Channel 4 Dispatches Programme**

Channel 4 broadcast a Dispatches episode entitled "How safe is Heathrow" on 4th September 2006. The programme focused on crime in Heathrow's cargo area, Operation Grafton (a Police initiative to deal with organised crime at the airport) and a perceived weakness in the security arrangements in the controlled cargo area.

Despite Channel 4 heavily promoting the programme in advance, Heathrow received very little media interest.

Heathrow issued the following statement to Channel 4 in response.

"Airport security is BAA's number one priority. This has to be achieved in a way that allows businesses within the airport to function effectively.

We seek to do this with regular advice and cooperation from the Police, Department for Transport (which sets the rules) and the cargo operators. This regularly results in changes to procedures and several of these have recently occurred at and around Control Post 10.

Staff who pass through Control Post 10 into the controlled cargo area do not have access to the more sensitive restricted airside areas without passing through another layer of security. Discussing these exact arrangements would be irresponsible in the current security climate and would only assist those wishing to engage in unlawful activity."

6. **Northern Runway Eastern Apron Works**

Daytime alternation has been currently suspended when the airport is operating on westerly operations, due to essential works happening at the eastern end of the northern runway. Members were informed of these works at the HACC meeting in May 2006 and since then BAA have sent a letter to key stakeholders and local residents informing them of the situation and how they will be affected by it.

Work started on the night 10<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> September 2006 and will last up to 10 weeks (BAA will do everything within their power to ensure that the works finish earlier than this).

The works will have no effect on easterly operations and hence no effect on the Cranford Agreement. In addition, there will be no effect on night alternation i.e. after the last departure, until 6.00 a.m.

7. **Calls for BAA break-up**

BAA issued a statement in August in light of British Airways call for the break-up of BAA. This was part of the airline's submission to the Office of Fair Trading's (OFT) investigation into the UK airports market, announced in May this year. The OFT is to look at whether the airports market is anti-competitive.

British Airways has called for separate ownership of Heathrow and Stansted as it believes two airports with Government approval to build new runways should not be owned by the same company. The BAA response was as follows:

“BAA welcomes the OFT inquiry and is co-operating fully. Evidence to date suggests that the current ownership structure of UK airports serves the public interest well.

Any intervention aimed at increasing competition in the market would need to demonstrate clearly that the benefits to consumers would outweigh potential disadvantages such as reduced likelihood of investment - that’s a very big test – let’s see the argument.”

8. **Heathrow East**

The public consultation on Heathrow East - a proposal to re-develop Heathrow Terminals 1 and 2 with a brand new 30 million passengers per annum terminal in the Central Terminal Area – finished in August 2006. The consultation lasted 6 weeks and involved five public exhibitions in villages around Heathrow Airport. A special bulletin of Heathrow Inform was distributed to 20,000 local residents. BAA received 300 respondents: 59% (positive), 38% (neutral) and 3% (negative).

A planning application is expected to be submitted in October 2006.

9. **Terminal 5**

The Piccadilly line loop to Terminal 4 re-opened on 17<sup>th</sup> September 2006, on schedule, following its closure in January 2005. The project has been delivered on budget and with one of the best safety records of any part of the T5 works.

The first four vehicles that will be used in the Track Transit System at T5 have been shipped over from Pittsburgh in the US were lowered into position on 14<sup>th</sup> September 2006. Each vehicle has taken two years to build at a cost of £1.2 million. The vehicles will be used to transport passengers between Terminal 5 and its satellite building when it opens in 2008.

Terminal 5 is almost 85% complete.

*Notable Visits*

Margaret Hodge, Minister of State for Industry and the Regions visited T5 on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2006.

Shaun Woodward, Minister for Tourism visited T5 on 4<sup>th</sup> September 2006.

Peter Hendy, Commissioner for London visited T5 on 11<sup>th</sup> July 2006.

HRH Duke of Edinburgh visited T5 on 12<sup>th</sup> July 2006.

10. **Heathrow Inform Newsletter**

The second edition of the Heathrow Inform newsletter was sent out on 30<sup>th</sup> August 2006 to 15,500 homes around Heathrow. The newsletter has been well received by local residents and councillors.

11. **Personal Rapid Transit System**

A planning application has been submitted to Hillingdon to create a test track for the Personal Rapid Transit system. Residents of Longford village have been sent a two-sided fact sheet explaining the proposal and were invited to attend a public meeting in August.

The route will go from a car park on the North side of the airport to the Terminal 5 car park. The electric 'pods' will run on a concrete guide way and produce zero emissions at the point of use. It is envisaged that the pods will be trialled from Summer 2008.

12. Tony Douglas, BAA Chief Executive Officer stated that it was his desire to attend as many as HACC meetings as he could in the future, for dialogue with the Committee. As the Members would be aware, since the July meeting Heathrow Airport had gone through a number of fundamental changes with the ownership and structure of BAA, and as a consequence it was now undergoing a period of restructuring.

Mr. Douglas explained that his own position as BAA Managing Director had changed. A number of management layers had been taken out of the business, and as a consequence he was now the Chief Executive Officer of Heathrow. There was no longer two roles for Managing Director and Divisional Director. Therefore regrettably, it would not be possible to commit to every HACC meeting, but he would do his level best to attend as often as he sensibly could.

In terms of the structure that was being put into place by BAA, the principal accountability, certainly for many of the questions that the Members had already raised at the meeting, would sit with Mike Forster, BAA Business Strategy Director for this part of the Group at Heathrow Airport. Ben Morton, BAA Director of Communications at Heathrow would also attend HACC to take points forward for the Members of this important forum.

With regard to the **change of ownership**. BAA had been acquired by Ferrovial who were a group of companies based in Madrid, incorporating GIC of Singapore and the Quebec Teachers Pension Fund. It was an investment strategy that affords a different form of ownership. BAA now had three shareholders, as opposed to many thousands of shareholders. Ferrovial had secured 62% of the ownership structure. They had made it very clear that they had been motivated to buy BAA because of its unique position in this particular marketplace and because of the value they believed that it represented. Ferrovial were also very clear in their strategy that they were a long-term institutional investor, and as a consequence had reinforced their support to the investment plan that the BAA management had been putting forward.

Another event in recent months, and in many ways the impact was still very much with BAA, was the **Security crisis** that occurred on 10<sup>th</sup> August 2006. A very dangerous set of circumstances could have impacted on the safety and security of the passengers at Heathrow. Fortunately, the sterling work of the security services intercepted what could have been. a hideous terrorist plot. Since that date, there had been a fundamental change to the security procedures in place at Heathrow as in other airports in the United Kingdom.

There was an alleviation in the security procedure three weeks ago (early September) which took the threat down from the immediate impact of the first four days. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> September 2006, there was a further change which meant that passengers were able to take one IATA bag-sized piece of luggage into the cabin of the aircraft.

However, there was still a ban in place that people would be aware of in terms of fluids and gels, albeit solid type make-up was now permitted into the airport. This has had a huge impact in terms of queuing and running the schedules. From a capacity standpoint for the airport and London, Flight Connections were part of that process. Over 30% of the passengers that travel through Heathrow would actually come from another starting location and would connect via Heathrow over to other destinations without ever landing, in the official sense, within London.

The changes to procedures had meant that passengers coming into Heathrow from many different countries around the world through the Flight Connections process and had presented themselves sometimes, understandably, with one or more pieces of baggage. These were often over-sized compared to the new specification protocol. They had also been in possession of fluids and gels . This had placed BAA in a position where only two options had been available to the passenger in that situation. On landing, they had to either re-check in with the extra pieces of baggage into the normal baggage process or to leave the offending item(s) behind, neither of which are acceptable to the majority of the travelling public.

As a consequence, BAA had seen a serious downturn in traffic that was going through the Flight Connections process in London and equally a significant upturn had been observed in the way that the traffic was going through into Frankfurt, Charles de Gaulle in Paris and Schipol in Amsterdam. Clearly, those airports and airlines, understandably that operate in those areas had meant that they offered a competitive product and made this very clear to the travelling public, at a time when it was difficult to travel in London through Heathrow.

Mr. Douglas said he was working tirelessly as to how BAA could work with the Department for Transport and all other bodies to establish what alleviations and security changes could be effected to improve the Flight Connections proposition. Realistically, until the fluids ban was lifted, it was safe to assume that Heathrow would be subject to those kind of difficulties.

The airport community had worked extremely well. There had been a huge amount of volunteer and personal endeavour to deal with the major disruption that this particular crisis had brought to bear. BAA would simply not have the amount of staff required waiting around for an incident of such great magnitude to take effect. A large recruitment process was currently underway, as it was believed that a number of the new security measures were likely to stay in place for some time.

Operationally, in the first seven days of the incident, the airport was back to a normal schedule. However, BAA still suffered from the impact of different security protocols. Realistically, this was likely to be the case for the foreseeable future.

In terms of other developments to bring to the attention of the Members.

Mr. Douglas said that **Heathrow East** was a development proposition for replacing the current Terminal 2. Once this opened, the capacity of Terminal 1 will be included within the new terminal.

BAA planned to outline the planning permission for this within the next 2-3 weeks. The development would remove the 1950's built Terminal 2 and replace that particular footprint. It was stressed that would introduce no additional capacity, it would simply replace the capacity of both Terminal 2 and Terminal 1. By the time that Heathrow East opened, BAA would close Terminal 1 and move the passengers to the new facility.

BAA were acutely aware that the **Northern Runway Apron Works** was an activity which was clearly affecting the day-time working pattern of the alternation process and for the local residents it was a source of great frustration and inconvenience.

Letters had been sent to all residents within the areas affected by this, with a commitment given that the work would be completed as fast as was humanly possible. A work programme of ten weeks had been agreed which commenced on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2006. BAA were looking to do everything within its power to deliver the work sooner than the ten weeks that was originally agreed.

Following on from this presentation, Members asked questions/responded.

1. Cllr. Elengorn referred to the question that he had put to BAA under Minute 3066 (a). Whilst he agreed that the Northern Runway Apron Works had been referred to in the July minutes where notification had been given to the Members of the Committee, it was not thought that this was the way that BAA should communicate to the local authorities. Letters were not sent out until 29<sup>th</sup> August 2006, almost just before the work commenced, which was inadequate notice. A request was made that more knowledge of such works with better communication be extended to the community. Large numbers of residents in Barnes had not been informed of these works.

Ben Morton responded that firstly, it was the policy of BAA to inform people approximately two weeks in advance of works. In terms of contacting the residents, a news bulletin magazine entitled 'Heathrow Inform' was distributed to 20,000 residents, in which discussion surrounding these works was published. However, the circulation for this magazine did not go out as far as the area of Barnes. Letters were also sent to all Councillors, MPs and local authorities.

Cllr. Elengorn stated that Barnes was affected by the noise, even though it was a long way from Heathrow. It was reiterated that two weeks notice of the pending works was inadequate.

Ben Morton replied that the point made by Cllr. Elengorn was noted. He would re-look at the communication process for such future works.

2. Philip Carlisle referred to Security. Following on the Passenger Services Sub-Committee meeting held on the morning of 27<sup>th</sup> September 2006, certain observations had been made by the Members, which he wished to pass on to BAA.

It was noted that a new permanent BAA representative had been appointed to the Committee, which was pleasing to note.

Firstly, there was every sympathy with the airport and the airlines who had been faced with major changes to the security process at 2.00 a.m. on the morning of 10<sup>th</sup> August 2006. Therefore, the Members tried to ignore the first three or four days after the event.

However, from observations made from reports and indeed letters and communications received from passengers into the Committee, six points had been raised.

Firstly, in relation to Security, the Committee would like to see consistency in relation to security arrangements between the terminals and the BAA airports, and even all other airports. The Members did travel and had observed the differences in protocol. It was believed to be a staff training problem in the inconsistency of knowledge.

Secondly, an improvement should be made to the information of clearance of goods purchased Airside Duty Free. Passengers should be made aware at point of sale, that liquids were not permitted on flights to the US. It had been reported to the Committee that many people had bought goods Airside and had a receipt, but the goods were still taken off the passenger. Whilst this might only be a small indication and was not suggested that this was a major problem, Philip Carlisle requested that this anomaly should be checked by BAA.

Thirdly, a point which had exacerbated the situation was the problem that goods that had been confiscated were disappearing and were not being checked in to Lost Property or a receipt issued, and yet the passengers were being told they could reclaim their goods from that office.

This matter needed to be investigated by BAA. Aside to this, it was understood that a passenger had up to 30 days in which to reclaim personal possessions from Lost Property.

It had been advocated by PSSC on a previous occasions, that in line with a system in operation in American airports, if goods were taken off them. the passenger would place the goods in a pre-paid envelope which would be posted back to them at their home address. It was also suggested that BAA staff should be made aware that goods were not being 'confiscated' as the passenger expected to be able to retrieve them back again.

Fourthly, it would appear that 'somebody' had taken the opportunity amongst the time of the confusion to open the hold baggage and take possessions out of that baggage. The question was asked if there were any type of checks made on the Baggage Handlers in line with the Criminal Record Checks that all staff had to undertake. It was thought that the checks on Baggage Handlers should be more stringent.

For the fifth point, Philip Carlisle reported that a Member of the Committee had managed to board an aeroplane, late in the evening which was half-full, because at that particular terminal, the Security staff at check-in, had all left work on time, although the passengers were still waiting and whose baggage had already gone Airside. It was understood that this had caused further confusion as the passengers who did not board the flight needed to be moved Airside to reclaim their baggage.

It was hoped that BAA would have a contingency plan, or at least to pay Security check-in staff overtime if necessary, to make sure that whilst there were still passengers Landside and an aeroplane still waiting to depart, they would be checked in.

The sixth point, which whilst it was appreciated was difficult, was a matter of passenger perception and experience relating to X-Ray machines.

Two examples were given. Firstly, on the morning of 26<sup>th</sup> September 2006, at 5.20 a.m. in Terminal 1, only two or three X-Ray machines were working. The remainder were not manned. Secondly, at 3.00 p.m. at another Terminal, all channels were open, but no passengers were going through them.

It was suggested that the pattern of staff shifts should be addressed to accommodate the needs of the passengers at the X-Ray machines.

Philip Carlisle referred to the subject of ID Passes. One particular Member of the Committee had received clearance from the Criminal Record Check. However, BAA was unable to process the application further as they were unable to take the references up.

It was understood that it had been suggested that the Secretary of HACC/PSSC should become an authorised signatory in order to take up references on behalf of BAA. It was thought that this was totally inappropriate, as it was not the function of a Secretary to take up references for ID passes. It was preferred that the references and ID passes for the Members of the Committee were not taken up by the Secretary nor the decision made to sign-off or otherwise, as to the issuance of the pass. This should be carried out by BAA.

The Members of the Committee tried to work on behalf of BAA and therefore were seen as BAA staff for this purpose. It was requested that the co-operation and courtesy of BAA be extended to addressing this difficult situation and it was hoped that the position could be resolved.

The Chairman added that after ten years on the Committee, his Security ID Pass had now expired, and the security machines would not accept it. However, he had not renewed the pass due to the protocol involved, but now attended the meetings at Heathrow as a visitor.

Tony Douglas thanked Philip Carlisle for the points he had made and that it was acknowledged the difficult situation that BAA had faced at the time of the security crisis. To put this into perspective, the security process multiplied by a factor of four at the time at which the crisis started, would have required an additional 1,600 staff immediately. This would give an idea of the scale of the change, over the period of time that this had occurred.

There were 26 minor changes within the first two weeks and 3 major Directive changes since 10<sup>th</sup> August 2006. It was a challenge focused on inconsistency, as it had been extremely difficult to announce the modifications. BAA dealt with in excess of 1.5 million passengers per week. It was a multiple challenge which was accepted

In regard to Airside purchases for liquids or Duty Free products, there was an ongoing dialogue with Government. It may well be that by the following day the US situation would be reviewed again. Therefore, it would be one message for everybody. Hopefully, to avoid the confusion, the inconsistency would be taken away as to what the passenger could take on board.

In terms of resourcing against the schedule, these had been hugely variable. The input schedule was received from the main different airlines with the number of departing and arriving passengers that were anticipated, and BAA resourced against that basis.

It had been observed that fewer passengers had been coming through Flight Connections, although Domestic had increased by 5%.

On the question of the cost of the additional staff that would be needed, and the suggestion that perhaps BAA could issue overtime, it must be remembered that as with other businesses, the company was subject to the Working Time Directive procedures that were in place to protect employees.

600 people who had volunteered to support to try and help with the problem. At certain stages, it was close to the airport being almost impossible to keep running. in any way that BAA would see fit.

During the next three-and-a-half months, BAA continued to seek and recruit in excess of 450 additional security staff.

In relation to the Baggage Handlers and the additional screening suggested, legally BAA followed very clear guidelines from the Government department responsible. The baggage handling contracts were led by the airlines to appoint the baggage handlers, of which BAA played no part and had no direct intervention

Tony Douglas said that he had acknowledged the points that had been made by Philip Carlisle.

3. Cllr. Beer referred to the Heathrow Fact Sheet that had been circulated to the Members by Ben Morton. A request was made that relevant information could be made available on other airports. Heathrow had been presented in the document as if it were the only airport that served London, which was not the case. There were three airports which served London. More facts were required on other airports, in order that a true comparison could be made with the Continental airports.

Ben Morton said that this point had been noted.

4. John Gurney referred to Minute 3009 (5) of the March 2006 HACC meeting where he had raised the issue of the laptops being taken out of the cases at check-in. It was suggested that at the passenger areas, tables should be placed for personal belongings to be placed upon before coming up to the check-in X-Ray scanning machine. This would speed the process up. In Terminal 4, at both staff and passenger areas, no improvement had been made at all. The same position remained as at the beginning of the year.

Tony Douglas responded that in relation to the passenger preparation areas, BAA had looked at the profile at each terminal. In Terminal 3, this practice was in place. However, at Terminal 4 in particular, there was simply not enough space.

BAA were currently looking to see if they could change the Security area altogether to be able to introduce more processing facilities and to be able to introduce additional security guards to match those facilities. In certain terminals, the available space was long and thin or short and fat. The layout determined physically what could be installed, when BAA had trialled and tested this.

On the pre-loader (the person at the front of the security machine) an additional roller had been installed where staff take the belongings off the passenger and load it into the system, which would then pass through the human scanners. This had created an impact of an extra throughput of between 20-40 people per hour, which was far greater than when people were doing this themselves, by placing the possessions on a bench.

The Chairman thanked Tony Douglas for his attendance and input at HACC.

**3069 SECURITY PROBLEMS AT HEATHROW AIRPORT SINCE 10<sup>th</sup> AUGUST 2006**

1. Report by the Technical Adviser (**HACC 467**) and **Press Releases** (a) Alaska Airlines and Horizon Air Recommend Travellers Check All Baggage, Arrive Early and (b) Atlanta Airport Collaborates with Federal Government to Continue Smooth Operations During Increased Federal Security Alert had been circulated with the Agenda and were noted.

**3070 FLIGHT OF EVERGREEN B.747 OVER LONDON AND SOUTH EAST ENGLAND**

1. Report by the Technical Adviser (**HACC 466**) had been circulated with the Agenda and was noted.
2. Iain Hope stated that he was one of the parties who had originally commented that the reply from Sir Roy McNulty, Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority in response to the letter sent on behalf of the Committee was unsatisfactory, by refusing to attend a HACC meeting to answer the questions that the Members wished to address to him. Following on from this, having read the latest material that had been received from Gillian Merron MP, it was thought that the Committee should feel relieved and pleased that very real progress had been made on this issue.

The change in the Regulations in the Manual were very important. It was thought this was as far as the Committee could go with this debate. Within the Aviation Law, it was all based on the principle that the Captain was solely responsible ultimately for the safety of the aircraft, and those passengers travelling on it. Therefore, the power had to remain under International Law that the pilot would make the final decision as to where he would land, bearing in mind the situation on the aircraft at the time of the emergency. He alone would know very precisely the situation on the aircraft, and hopefully which emergency procedures to operate to achieve a successful and safe landing.

Iain Hope said that he would suggest that whilst he was sorry that there was still an unwillingness on the part of the CAA to meet with the Committee, that the Members should accept the situation and point as it is, and let the matter rest. The Committee could hunt the parties concerned on other issues that they may be able to assist with, but it was felt that the debate on the Evergreen B747 had gone as far as it could with the Civil Aviation Authority and the Minister for Aviation at the Department for Transport.

3. The Chairman stated that a copy of Hansard has been tabled for the benefit of the Members originating from the 4<sup>th</sup> July 2006, when an agenda debate in Parliament had taken place on the same topic.

4. Cllr. Turrell said that whilst it was agreed that the change in the Regulations was welcomed, it was also useful that this issue had been flagged up. It was hoped that it was now on the 'radar' as to where the pilots in transit fly and in terms of the US pilot, they could travel to an airport where they could carry out correct procedures.

5. Cllr. Cadbury stated that she understood the comment made by Iain Hope and the fact that it would be difficult to challenge the principle of the Captain of the aircraft involved. However, the debate involved many thousands of people who could have been affected, had the incident not worked out as well as it did.

. It was thought that there could possibly be more work undertaken in relation to the information that the pilots received on which to make informed decisions. From recollection, this was the problem issue with the Evergreen B737 flight. She thought that it was a US military aircraft and only had access to certain information, illustrating the inconsistencies, depending on where the aeroplane was destined.

Ruth Cadbury thought that the matter should not be dropped.

Without compromising the principle, it was believed that more work could be done by the CAA to make the information more accessible to allow the pilots to make safe choices.

6. Cllr. Ceaser agreed with Cllr. Cadbury. Whilst revised Guidance had been introduced, the one point that still really concerned him on this matter, was the fact that advice was simply being passed on to the Captain. There was nothing which had dictated, from what he had read of the event so far, that there was not going to be any great result or change to the principle of flying over highly populated areas.

Cllr. Ceaser said that if a B747 was flying on three engines with the pilot stating that he was unsure as to where he was going and if he had enough power to land or not, by flying over in the direction of Heathrow, across the centre of London was asking for trouble.

It was thought that this debate should be pressed further to see if it was possible to get a specific that emergency flights such as the Evergreen B.747 did not come in over the most densely populated part of this country.

If the pilot had come in over Maidstone, he would have the opportunity to land at Stansted or Gatwick, which was a considerably less populated area, than coming in over London. However, it was accepted that Stansted was further away than Heathrow or Gatwick would have been in distance to Maidstone. There had to be some degree of direction given on this matter, otherwise, it could be the case, that a future similar scenario may arise where an aeroplane could be flying in on an emergency landing, which could come down, possibly on the Houses of Parliament.

7. Cllr. Elengorn agreed with the sentiments made by both Cllr. Cadbury and Cllr. Ceaser. It was a presumption that such emergency flights did not overfly populated areas.

He drew attention to another incident that had been reported by the BBC of a Boeing aircraft which had descended at the wrong angle. It was only when it broke cloud cover that it realised that it would go off course. It kept going, and very late in the day it was able to land safely. There appeared to be communication problems with NATS on this occasion. Although a different incident, it proved how vulnerable the flights are.

8. Cllr. Horn believed that it should be not be that difficult to provide a list of further designated landing systems to the pilots in the case of emergencies.
9. The Chairman stated that there was obviously keen interest amongst the Members in taking this debate further. It was suggested that rather than asking the Technical Adviser to draft a further letter to the Minister, a Sub-Committee meeting could be held in November, for those who were particularly interested in this topic, where they could raise questions and put forward comments.
10. Margaret Majumdar requested that further to this suggestion, could a relevant representative from the DfT attend the meeting.

The Chairman responded that it was the responsibility of the CAA to address this matter. They were the reluctant participants. However, they would again be asked to attend a meeting of the Committee.

11. Cllr. Ceaser thought it appropriate that if the CAA were totally reluctant to address the Committee on this matter that the Members could talk to the local Press and those in London, as it was thought that a newspaper such as the 'Evening Standard' would be immensely interested to know that there was a chance of a 'distressed' aircraft coming in over the centre of London.

12. Cllr. Beer said that he shared the view of his local authority colleagues. Day-to-day Air Traffic Control instructs the pilot where to go to deviate from a recognised route e.g. if there was congestion up in the skies. They had operational control and were constantly monitoring movements.

The pilot of the Evergreen B747 realised that he was in trouble over Reading. The aeroplane came over the entire South of England and carried out another approach over the Thames Estuary. It should have been re-directed to Brize Norton or another military base with plenty of space out in the countryside. The alternative may well have been that it would come down the Thames Valley across Reading, Slough, Windsor and Maidenhead which was just as bad. It was totally inconceivable that a pilot who was not familiar with the area was able to make a decision to bring a cargo aeroplane with a minimal crew on board over London. This would have jeopardised the lives of millions of people in London. This stipulation had been applied, the principles for which no doubt were evolved in the time of maritime days when sailing boats were still being used.

It was necessary to have the people who had the technical information and the radar charts up on the screen in front of them to be able to take control.

At the Noise & Track Keeping Working Group meeting held on the 19<sup>th</sup> September 2006, a report was given as to why Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) was not universally adopted. It was because there were 20,000 licensed pilots in America and very seldom did any of those in fact travel outside of American airspace. When they did travel outside of the designated airspace, they had no familiarity whatsoever with the Regulations applied in Europe or Great Britain. These were the pilots who generally, did not comply with the CDA approach system as they were not familiar with it. It was these same pilots who could fall into difficulties and yet be allowed to decide where they landed their aeroplane.

Cllr. Beer believed that it was necessary to have greater control over the Air Traffic Controllers in the United States. It could not be left to the discretion of a pilot who may not be familiar with the territory. Representations should be made. It was possible to alter the rules and make recognised changes. He thought that this was a key example of where a change had to be made.

13. Cllr. Horn suggested that if the CAA were reluctant to attend a HACC meeting, certain representative members could visit the offices of the CAA to discuss the matter further on behalf of the Committee.

The Chairman said that he was agreeable for two or three representatives from the Committee to visit the CAA and take them to task.

14. Cllr. Cadbury commented that having read the letter from Gillian Merron MP there was a specific question that needed to be asked with a response received, before seeking a meeting. The letter had stated that *'where possible, when expeditious routing is not required, suggestions of alternative runways or aerodromes, together with the rationale that the routing would avoid densely populated areas and be consistent with safety shall be passed to the pilot and his intentions requested'*. The CAA has promulgated this revised guidance to all relevant air navigation service providers and training institutions.

Cllr. Cadbury said that the Committee wished to see that advice as to what had changed in practice since the Evergreen B.747 Report had been written. Evidence was needed as to the difference it had made and if it covered all aircraft flying over UK airspace. It was suggested that two or three questions be asked on those lines and the answers sought. On receipt of a response, the Members could establish if a meeting was required with the CAA, as the Committee Members were restricted in time for availability to attend such meetings.

The Chairman responded that the CAA had accepted the Recommendation and issued revised Guidance.

Cllr. Cadbury replied that it was necessary for the Members to see the detail of the Recommendation, as it was the lack of detail that was apparent. The original Investigation Report was quite detailed.

The Chairman read verbatim from the Report, illustrating the new advice. *'It is desirable that aircraft in emergencies should not be routed over densely populated areas, particularly if there is reason to believe the aircraft's ability to remain in controlled flight is compromised or that parts of the aircraft could affect flight. If this is inconsistent with providing a most appropriate service to the aircraft, for example, when any extended routing could further jeopardise safety of the aircraft, the most expeditious route is the one that should be given. Where possible, when expeditious routing is not required, suggestions of alternative runways or aerodromes, together with the rationale that the routing would avoid densely populated areas and be consistent with safety shall be passed to the pilot and his intentions requested'*.

Basically, this was interpreted that the CAA would suggest to the pilot that they did not fly over densely populated areas. However, the final decision would still remain at the discretion of the pilot.

Cllr. Cadbury further responded that whilst this was understood, clarification was needed as to whether the information regarding alternatives that was not available to the other Evergreen pilot would now be available to all flights.. The query related as to the level of information and detail that would be available. How would the alternatives be presented to the pilots. It was these questions that needed to be answered.

15. The Technical Adviser stated that all the facts that the Chairman had read out were being promulgated to Air Traffic Controllers to tell them to pay more attention than they were required to previously, as to where the aircraft would probably be going to fly. So far as the Air Traffic Controllers were concerned, who were handling any of these aircraft, they did have full details available to them about the alternatives. Previously, they were not required to suggest alternatives to pilots.

Looking at the Report of this incident, which the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) had issued, there was no suggestion whatsoever, that the pilot was told that it was not a good idea to come into Heathrow because of the implications. Now, Air Traffic Controllers were required to carry out an instruction along those lines.

The Evergreen B.747 was a civilian aircraft, operating on a charter for the United States Air Force. It was not a military aircraft. Its load was an aircraft engine that was being taken back to the United States to be overhauled. The only reason that the pilot requested to land at Heathrow was because he did not have charts available, except military airfields in the area. Solely because he had seen Heathrow, he decided that was where he wanted to land. At that time, the Controllers were not required as they are now, to suggest to a pilot that it would not be a good idea to land at Heathrow, as they would be flying over London.

The Technical Adviser said, as to the suggestion for the Committee to try to hold a meeting with the Civil Aviation Authority or similar, he had tried to instigate this. However, the CAA had responded that they felt they did not wish to attend a meeting with the HACC Members, as they did not see there was any further action that was available to them.

The letter that had been put before the Members was from the Minister for Aviation, who had been contacted to try to use her influence with the Civil Aviation Authority to set up such a meeting. The only response that had been received from the Minister was a letter, which largely reiterated the points made originally by the Civil Aviation Authority Chairman. It ignored totally the request made on behalf of the Committee to intervene with the Civil Aviation Authority to enable HACC to arrange a meeting with them. It was a question as to where one could go next to get an agreement to the request after the Minister had ignored that.

16. The Chairman asked for the opinion of the Members as to whether they wished to again pursue the possibility of a meeting being arranged with representatives of the CAA in attendance or a Special Meeting of HACC could be convened to put various points together or both options could be sought.

Alternatively, as Iain Hope had suggested, the Members might believe that the debate had been fully explored in all the relevant avenues and no further action could be taken.

17. Cllr. Cadbury suggested that the Committee should again seek a meeting with the CAA.
18. Cllr. Ceaser thought that the matter must be pursued with the CAA, otherwise the Committee would be letting the residents of London down, if it was not taken further. The situation had such an enormous potential for problems that it must be sorted out, so as to be certain that aircraft where in an emergency situation and needed to land effectively, did not have to fly twice over London.

It was suggested that if the Minister did not wish to take further action, that it would be advisable for the Members to lobby local MPs directly on this matter with questions as to their intention in this debate, to take forward on behalf of the Committee.

19. The Chairman agreed that the Committee would seek a meeting with the CAA and hold a pre-meeting of the Members to debate the matter further. Any party who had an interest in this subject would be invited. In the meantime, it was requested that if Members could use their influence with the Press and their MPs, this would be to the good.

**3071 PROJECT FOR THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF HEATHROW (PSDH)**

1. Update report by the Department for Transport on the work of the Technical Groups A presentation was made at the July meeting on the Air Quality Technical Report. (365 pages), which had been published on the 19th July 2006, the 8-page Executive Summary and 2-page highlight Summary from which had been circulated with the Agenda and was noted. A full copy of the Report has been sent to each Member of the Committee.
2. David Gray had issued a Progress Note which summarised the key developments in PSDH since the last HACC meeting in July 2006. Annexed to this was the substance of a note explaining how the DfT were evaluating scenarios at Heathrow based on a note that went to the External Advisory Group several weeks earlier. It also included representatives from the aviation industry, local authorities and environmental groups.

The Department for Transport were in the middle of the PSDH programme. As previously explained, the scenarios were being run through a suite of models. This work continued and until results were produced from it, there was not a great deal more in terms of substance that could be relayed to the Committee at this point.

Following on from this presentation, Members asked questions/responded.

3. Rob Gibson asked if there was any intention to model a scenario whereby a third runway would be tested with mixed-mode operation at Heathrow.

David Gray replied that yes, the modelling exercise would include some assessment of Heathrow with a third runway and a variety of options in which that runway might be operated alongside the existing runways. It was thought that at least one of those options would be looking at the impacts of mixed-mode on the existing runways as well as on the new runway.

Mike Forster stated that in principle this was correct. There would never be both the current runways and the third runway in mixed-mode at the same time. This was part of the concept of operations.

5. Margaret Majumdar referred to the second section of the Paper entitled 'Issues for Consultation', which listed bullet points of the topics that would be included in the document. The question was asked if the consultation would contain plans of the take-off routes that would be used to the East of the runways during mixed-mode, as clearly they would need to change from the current routes, if they were being used at the same time.

David Gray replied that basically the answer was yes. There would be details about the proposed departure routes documented, with supporting information.

Mike Forster said he believed the consultation would show indicative routes, not final routes. It was stressed that the reason for this was the fact that no changes could be made to Airspace without a full safety case and a Airspace Change Proposal process which would have its own private consultation. In terms of this piece of work indicating whether mixed-mode was possible and what would be the likely impacts; that consultation document would show these.

6. Cllr. Cadbury asked if increasing the capacity at Heathrow would affect the 480,000 cap and if it would be a feature in the consultation.

David Gray responded that the consultation would not affect the cap, in the sense that it was set and until such time that a planning application was brought in to relax it, it would remain the case. The consultation would make clear what the anticipated capacity increases would be in any given scenario.

7. Cllr. Bishop said that he was grateful to the Advisors at the LB Hillingdon who briefed the Councillors. He had pointed out that on page 3 of the DfT Progress Note, it referred to a 2010 'business as usual' scenario that would be modelled to check air quality compliance with the European Union that is to come into force in 2010.

The question was asked as to what would happen if the 'business as usual' scenario for 2010 exceeded the European Union limit. Would the mixed-mode be stopped.

David Gray responded that if that was the case, the DfT would need to indicate what sort of measures they anticipated would be taken in order to bring the UK back into compliance. In that respect, the point would be addressed in the consultation.

8. Gareth Harper referred to the maximum additional capacity. He said that the Progress Note suggested that in 2015, there was not actually that much additional capacity with mixed-mode. However, looking at the statistics, if Heathrow could handle 480,000 ATM per annum, surely mixed-mode would indicate 960,000 ATM per annum.

David Gray responded that he did not follow the arithmetic to reach such an assumption. However, he assured that the figure was not that great. The DfT were currently looking at scenarios that assumed roundly that mixed-mode might give 10%-12% or thereabouts. additional capacity. This would mean that from 480,000 ATM per annum, it would increase to 540,000 ATM per annum.

Gareth Harper asked if this figure was a view shared by the CAA and the industry relating to Heathrow's capacity.

David Gray responded that the figure of 540,000 ATM per annum was taken to represent an operational limit. This had not yet been subjected to the question of whether operating at that level meets all the environmental tests in terms of noise and air quality. It was not, as it were, meant to represent anticipated demand, but the maximum throughput that the DfT believed could be operated under mixed-mode at the airport.

Gareth Harper continued that it would be beneficial to see the basis of these assessments, as it did seem that it was a small addition to the capacity, although operating mixed-mode all day long.

David Gray replied that the basis for this would be set out when the point of consultation was reached.

9. Mike Forster commented that he thought it might be worth explaining the process that BAA were undertaking in this regard, as some of the questions did not indicate or make clear what the process might be.

The Project for the Sustainable Development of Heathrow (PSDH) was a DfT project. It was a technical evaluation project to see under what circumstances the environmental limits set within the Aviation White Paper could or could not be met.

The consultations on mixed-mode and a potential third runway would be undertaken by the end of this year and into next year.

The next step of the process would be policy decision from the Government as to whether they believed that this was an appropriate direction to take.

Following that, would then be the permission approval. This would mean for airspace change there would be an Airspace Change Proposal which would need to go through the CAA.

In terms of the cap., as mentioned by the Members this would need to go through a planning application, as it was a planning decision that was made by the T5 Inspector at the time of the Inquiry. Both of these would be extensive processes running on from the Project for the Sustainable Development of Heathrow. The detail would then need to be studied to ascertain exactly what could be delivered, against what routes and against the infrastructure and timescales proposed.

10. Rob Gibson asked for clarification if it was the view of the DfT that there would be a further consultation on the third runway, as he understood that the consultation was complete.

David Gray replied that in the Aviation White Paper it had been made clear, that if a third runway were to require additional capacity of terminal facilities, which was the advice that had been received from BAA in the Air Quality publication, it was correct to say that this was not part of the Government's original proposal and would therefore require further consultation.

Rob Gibson responded that he understood the actual position regarding the conditions of the third runway remained the same, as when the Department for Transport initially consulted on this in the Aviation White Paper.

David Gray stated that yes, it was correct to say that in a sense, the Aviation White Paper gave air quality approval in principle to a third runway. However, it was subject to going back for an environmental appraisal, particularly on the air quality side. Therefore, referring to the PSDH Air Quality Report, as reported on at the July HACC meeting, two years of work had been undertaken on the air quality methodology and assessment process. The DfT were now re-running a third runway option(s) through the environmental appraisal again.

There were two issues to consider. Firstly, to re-appraise the air quality impacts of a third runway, given the concerns of the Aviation White Paper that there were issues to address. Secondly, to consult again to the extent that the proposition for the third runway differs materially from that which was considered in 2002/2003.

11. Geoff Pope spoke on the question of surface access. It had been read that the model would be looking at the introduction of Airtrack and also Crossrail. Neither of these two projects had yet received funding approval, although it was understood that this could be more specific next year.

Two questions to be asked arising from this were firstly, would the model also be looking at the alternatives where Crossrail or Airtrack did not exist and how surface access might cope. Secondly, would the work be fed into any decision that would be made on Crossrail.

David Gray responded that in answer to the first question, the DfT were taking a whole range of possible options both with and without advancements to public transport e.g. Airtrack. If the second question was implying whether the result of the work would influence decisions on Crossrail, this would be a little bit like the 'tail wagging the dog'. It was thought that the questions relating to the Crossrail scheme would be taken in the light of a whole range of factors, many of which would be well outside of the PSDH. Clearly, the DfT needed to understand what the position would be if Crossrail served Heathrow.

12. Cllr. Bishop said that he noted with interest that the items for consultation did *not* include the suggestion that road traffic would only be suppressed by fairly aggressive policies for charging for access and/or parking.

He stated that the LB Hillingdon under the current administration, would not be happy for any consideration about charges to get into Heathrow Airport. That would severely impact on the residents of the LB Hillingdon.

Cllr.. Bishop said that he urged the DfT to include this as part of the consultation. He thought that the DfT would be surprised at the result they would receive.

David Gray responded that the consultation would be open so that people would be free to make whatever comments they wish. There would be a range of options. Clearly, if charging featured as an incidental part of the technical solution, there would be every opportunity to make views upon it known.

13. Cllr. Horn asked if it had been considered that Terminal 5 and the third runway will give the footfall of a 274% increase to what it is now.

The existing road network was currently under strain and at certain times of the day, came to a standstill, even at the widest point of the M25.

David Gray responded that clearly, the DfT were looking at the traffic implications of the third runway against the various levels of current traffic.

Mike Forster said he did not understand where Cllr. Horn had derived his mathematics of a 274% increase in traffic. It was certainly not as high as this figure. It was suggested that when the consultation paper was published, the various traffic implications would be seen.

Graham Horn pointed out that he had been informed that Terminal 5 had the same traffic capacity as the existing four terminals. It would double. He said he had also been informed that the third runway would produce a further 37% increase in traffic.

Mike Forster said that it was incorrect that it was a further 37%.

**3072 OPERATIONAL WORK OF THE IMMIGRATION SERVICE AT HEATHROW**

1. Presentation by Tom Dowdall, Deputy Director, Border Control, Heathrow. Command. Report by the Technical Adviser (**HACC 468**) had been circulated with the Agenda and was noted.
2. Mr. Dowdall outlined the direction that the UK Immigration Service was taking. The Home Office and the Immigration & Nationality Directorate of which they are part of, were consistently in the spotlight in a number of ways. This reflected in the events of recent months and the forthcoming events over the next couple of years.

The Immigration Service had been subject to a review conducted on behalf of the Home Secretary who had responsibility across the whole of the Directorate. In terms of Heathrow Airport, this meant that there was increased focus on the security and use of technology. Over the course of the next few years, there was a major programme of technology which was set to deliver between 2008-2014. The process was being worked on the e-borders control programme.

Considerable work had been undertaken prior to the major programme entitled 'e-solutions'. Some of this work was visible, although some of it was less so. The most visible elements were the bio-metric controls in place at Heathrow. IRIS Recognition controls had been implemented at all four terminals. These had also been installed at a number of other airports around the country. In very many ways, these were the first generation of bio-metric controls.

Many people across the UK had enrolled onto that system. It was targeted at facilitating passengers who were considered low-risk groups of passengers, who had effectively enrolled for the process and then would be in a position to pass through bio-metrically at any of the Channels at the Immigration Control, where they would traditionally have had to wait and be seen by an Immigration Officer.

There had been an increase in the number of enrolees. It was anticipated that during the lifespan of the IRIS Recognition project, that approximately one million people across all of the UK airports would use that system.

3. The Chairman pointed out that he understood that at the Passenger Services Sub-Committee meeting, held on the morning of the 27<sup>th</sup> September 2006, concern had been expressed that the IRIS Recognition facility was not always up and running.
4. Susan Parsons commented that from her own experience, it had taken some time to enrol for IRIS Recognition as the facility was never open. ABTA would be very happy to promote the system, as it was very good when it worked. However, the question was asked of the purpose of promoting a facility that you could not enrol for.

A frequent situation was apparent where the queue for IRIS Recognition was longer than it actually took to go through the normal Channels. It was a good system, but could be improved.

Tom Dowdall agreed that the system could be improved. In terms of the opening hours for enrolment, there had been pressure since 2005 on the resources at Heathrow, largely due to the re-introduction of embarkation controls in the wake of the 7/7 attacks, which at that stage, meant that there was a diversion of resources to dealing with that particular activity. This resulted in the temporary closure of the IRIS Recognition enrolment. This service has now since re-opened. All the IRIS Recognition enrolment stations are operated across all of the four terminals, but they were not open for 18 hours per day. An attempt was made to open the enrolment stations when it was known that there was likely to be a high demand.

Mr. Dowdall said that he was interested in exploring with the industry how enrolment could be taken on to the next stage. This would involve the potential to enrol passengers effectively at other locations other than the current IRIS enrolment stations. The suggestion made by ABTA was very much welcomed and other similar groups and he was keen to discuss with them how to look to promoting the service more widely.

5. Mako Mochizuki stated that she had a friend who was a British National and yet she had not been permitted to enrol for IRIS Recognition. The question was asked why.

Tom Dowdall responded that the registration service was primarily aimed at passengers who were considered to be frequent flyers. In addition to that, there were particular categories of passengers who could enrol and others who could not.

Mako Mochizuki continued that she herself used IRIS Recognition frequently and believed the facility worked well. However, the system was under utilised, and it was not understood why certain passengers were not allowed to enrol.

Tom Dowdall replied that there was a process by which the Immigration Service selected particular categories of passengers who could use the system to aim facilitation. However, there was a responsibility held by Immigration in terms of securing the border. This meant that there were certain passengers who unfortunately, would not be allowed to join the system.

6. The Chairman asked if there was a list of categorisation available and if a copy of this could be provided to the Secretary.

Tom Dowdall replied that the criteria was clearly listed in the promotional leaflet as to which passengers were allowed to apply for enrolment. A copy would be sent to the Secretary.

**(Secretary's Note):** The leaflet entitled '*Can I use IRIS*' states;  
You can apply to use **IRIS** if you are:-

- A **permanent resident** of the UK;
- **Permitted to enter or remain in the UK** for more than six months and you have more than two months left of your leave to enter or remain;
- **Holding a current entry clearance** that is effective as leave to enter the UK and the validity of the entry clearance has more than two months left;
- A **short-term visitor to the UK** and you can demonstrate you have been granted leave to enter the UK as a visitor on at least two occasions in the last six months, or four occasions in the last 12 months;
- **Exempt from Immigration Control** and you are based in the UK;
- A **family member of an EEA State National or of a Swiss National** based in the UK;
- A **British Citizen** or you have the **right of abode** in the UK or you are a **national of an EEA State** or you are a **Swiss National**.

7. Philip Carlisle stated that there would be a point where passengers who flew regularly might wish to enrol for the system. He was concerned that the IRIS Recognition system might become like the Fastrack syndrome, where it was no faster and sometime slower than the normal system. The queue might be longer than if the system was by-passed and a passenger walked down to the normal Immigration Control. The question was asked if more IRIS Recognition machines would become available on the project.

Tom Dowdall responded that the intention was to roll-out the present IRIS Recognition system to ten locations. For the future, Immigration would be looking to expand the number of bio-metric controls.

The next generation of these might involve the capture of other bio-metrics e.g. footprints, in addition to IRIS Recognition, as well as facial image. This would then allow the service to expand upon the categories of passengers who were booking the system. It was recognised that in the longer term, the facilitation of IRIS Recognition should try to increase the number of bio-metric controls to cover a much wider group of passengers. When the planning was undertaken for Terminal 5, this was done on the basis of making sure that the IRIS Recognition facility was sufficiently IT enabled to take multiple numbers of electronic controls of the future.

The major elements of the programme was not entirely related to the bio-metrics, it was about the security of the border and the number of steps that were being taken to be able to improve upon this and collect the information that would effectively be tested against the Immigration watch list and those of other border agencies. A major programme would be ongoing for a number of years, ending in 2014.

There were plans currently underway to make the Immigration Service a uniformed service at the border. It was the expectation that this would come into force in 2007.

There were other elements that were being looked at in terms of legislation and the powers of the Immigration Service, effectively to enhance that which occurred at the border.

There were several challenges ahead that had been set, both by the Home Secretary and previous Ministers, in addition to the Prime Minister.

Mr. Dowdall said that in terms of the question posed as to whether there were sufficient levels of staff at Heathrow, with reference to a report that had stated that the Immigration Officers were spread too thinly. He stated that at Heathrow, the human resources issue was as effective as it had been for some time, largely because of the recruitment drive that had taken place, to ensure that the service was maintained and met the challenges that would be faced with the increase in the number of terminals with the opening of Terminal 5 in 2008.

It would have been noticed that since 2004, enhanced checks were carried out on UK and European citizens entering the country and at the British Airways Channels also. The important point to note was that these checks were being carried out for a reason. When coming through the airport into Terminal 3 and Terminal 4 at peak periods, it was ensured that Immigration Officers were evident at the Desks. This continued to be a challenge for the Service with rising passenger numbers and more flights, which placed further pressure on the Arrivals Hall.

8. Keith Harlow asked if the work that was currently being undertaken on the bio-metric controls was internationally co-ordinated.

Tom Dowdall replied that yes this was, in the sense that the Immigration Service were working with both e-border partners and ICAO to the standards that they had set. There was work being trialled with other countries, which allowed the Immigration Service to be able to use bio-metric on passengers and exchange their information. It would enable passengers of all nationalities to travel to the UK, and similarly, for the UK passengers to be able to travel to other countries as well.

There was still a long way to go with the ongoing work that was being undertaken. It was recognised that this could not be a unilaterally UK decision

9. John Gurney stated that at certain terminals e.g. Terminal 4, a pre-inspection was conducted by Immigration Officers of arriving passengers before they reached the main Immigration point. The consequences of this check being carried out was the fact that the backlog of arriving passengers caused huge congestion out on the ramp. The whole area came to a standstill, as the search was being undertaken too close to the entry point into the terminal. The question was asked if a better method could be considered.

Tom Dowdall responded that one of the main issues and the risks involved as to why the Immigration teams were used, was the fact relating to the problem of the passengers who destroyed documents. These passengers would have boarded a flight with documents, but when they arrived in the UK they would have either destroyed those document or handed them on to a facilitator. The Immigration Officers knew this from their own information, even when the passenger(s) boarded the flight. It was absolutely essential where the Intelligence had been received to support it, that these checks were carried out as the aircraft arrived. This operation was carried out on the basis that there were certain flights when it was believed that this might happen. It was not carried out on all flights.

10. Cllr. Horn asked why the passenger documents could not be photocopied before the passenger(s) boarded the aircraft.

Mr. Dowdall replied that there were a number of reasons and issues surrounding this. Certain pieces of work had to be done internationally to forward the information to other countries. The difficulty with photocopying Passports was the fact that the quality would not necessarily be good and would not highlight the required information. It would also put additional pressure on the carriers in terms of capturing that information.

There was also no guarantee that at the point of origin for a flight, there was always the capability for that information to be obtained by Immigration and photocopied in the first place.

The longer-term solution would be to gather as much passenger information as possible, in advance of the arrival of the flight into the UK from the carriers.

The Immigration Service had trialled electronic document copying. The information would be collected on a memory stick and brought back to the UK. This had been used to effect in a number of countries. Work had been undertaken in liaison with the carriers on the provision of equipment, to see where this would be of most use.

The challenges of the risk areas surrounded the European hub airports. The difficulty relating to this was the fact that the flight was not restricted to one carrier, but multiple flights from multiple carriers coming into a number of locations in the UK.

11. The Technical Adviser referred to the question of a passenger who failed to produce an Immigration document, where there had been Press reports of people being imprisoned because they did not possess them. This seemed to contrast rather oddly. with people who entered the UK claiming asylum with no documents, where if not at Heathrow, but certainly at other Border Control Units they were told to go off and make their own way to Lunar House in Croydon to see if they could sort their position out. It was not surprising to note that many such people do not make the journey and disappear into the general population.

There was also the matter relating to Airport Health Control Units for Immigrants. The Technical Adviser was unsure if the Immigration Service operated these or worked in conjunction with them. There had been recent reports that the staffing of the Units had been cut, raising the prospect of people entering the country, particularly with Tuberculosis, unchecked. Mr. Dowdall was asked to comment on these facts.

Tom Dowdall replied that the responsibility for the Medical Units lay with the Health Protection Agency. The Immigration Service worked in conjunction with them. Cases would be referred onto the support medical staff who ran their own Immigration legislation. He was unable to comment on the issues raised, as this was under the auspices of the Health Protection Agency, who were run by the Primary Care Trusts in the areas concerned..

Mr. Dowdall offered to provide details of the Primary Care Trust for Heathrow.

**(Secretary's Note):** The person who has responsibility for the medical Primary Care Trust is Mr Shabeg Nagra, Divisional Environmental Health Officer, London Borough of Hillingdon. Tel: 01895 250190 or e-mail [snagra@hillingdon.gov.uk](mailto:snagra@hillingdon.gov.uk).

Mr. Dowdall said that in relation to passengers entering the country without documents, there were two separate issues to be identified. There was legislation to prosecute passengers who arrived with no documents. This was introduced in 1994. Any passenger who arrived at a UK port, (not only Heathrow) with no documents would be considered under this legislation, as appropriate.

The individuals might be prosecuted with the possibility of a custodial sentence. For those cases, this was separate to the Press reports that may have been seen relating to asylum seekers being sent independently to Croydon.

The Chairman thanked Mr. Dowdall for attending the HACC meeting and making his informative presentation.

### **3073 PASSENGER SERVICES SUB-COMMITTEE**

1. Minutes of the meeting of the Sub-Committee held on 26th July 2006 had been circulated with the Agenda and were noted. Comment was made on the meeting, held on the morning of 27th September 2006.
2. Cllr. Ceaser referred to Minute 6.0 on the subject of taxis where it had been stated that yet again, the BAA Travel Operations Manager was unavailable to update the Members and had sent his Apologies. This was not helpful in progressing the matter.

It was noted that another complaint had been sent to the Committee regarding the Taxi Rank at Terminal 4, whereby a passenger wished to travel to Ashford to an address which was half-a-mile out of the Greater London area and within two miles of Terminal 4. The first taxi refused to take the passenger and the second taxi requested £54.00.

Cllr. Ceaser said it was a ludicrous situation that a passenger could travel into Central London more cheaply than travel a hundred yards over the Greater London border. It was acknowledged that the Members of the Passenger Services Sub-Committee were aware of this fact.

It was understood that a further meeting of the Taxi Liaison Group would be held to sort this matter out. It would be appreciated to receive an update arising from the PSSC meeting held on the morning of 27<sup>th</sup> September 2006.

Philip Carlisle responded that there was not a detailed update available. Mr. Luke Howard, Senior Strategy Manager representing the TfL Public Carriage Office had attended the meeting. He was very helpful.. The Public Carriage Office were aware of the problem. He informed the Members that there was in place currently, a Bill before Parliament which if it becomes an Act will make a very small change to the circumstance as described by Cllr. Ceaser.

It was understood that a taxi driver could refuse to drive out of the Metropolitan area. Basically, although there would be an addition in this Act, which will arrive at the circumstance where the driver would go outside of the Metropolitan area and fail to reach an agreement for the journey, which would then result in the fare on the meter being paid by the passenger.

In the first instance, this would sound like an advance. However, firstly, the taxi driver could refuse and secondly, he would negotiate a fare with the passenger, which in this case could be very one-sided on the part of the driver. There was evidence that taxi drivers' could agree a fare and then stop half-way down the M4 and state that he had made mistake and that the passenger owed twice the negotiated fare. However, once the fare was agreed and the taxi had moved off, that would be the fare to be paid. This would be enforceable by the Public Carriage Office.

The Committee had received an agreement that should this system fall down, the 'mystery shoppers' from the PCO, who occasionally operated at Heathrow, but only on legitimate within area journeys, would see this and take the opportunity to report the incident.

The Public Carriage Office had heavily promoted the existence of licensed mini cabs who in their view, would be as relatively safe as the black cab. There was also discussion on other licensed cab operations outside of the boundary. The fact that they had provided information now, both from a technical point of view and on the website to find out the legitimate mini cabs to use was good. It was hoped that the actuality of competition in the future, might make the black cabs more realistic.

However, they probably now were already a little more realistic.

It was understood that of the five or seven associations of the black cab drivers there were two spokesmen who attended the Taxi Group Liaison meetings with BAA. It was known that BAA were still hopeful that these meetings would be fruitful, particularly in regard to the Code of Conduct and standard of dress for the taxi drivers.

It had been noted that the Technical Adviser was disturbed to find that the last two meetings had been cancelled, without adequate reason.

Philip Carlisle said he had previously reported to the Members that the BAA contact for the Committee had not attended the PSSC meeting yet again, to provide an update. As no other member of BAA had attended the meeting in his stead, the debate on taxis could not be taken any further forward.

For want of a better source of information, Mr. Luke Howard (PCO) had been asked to confirm the next Taxi Liaison Group meeting date, in order that the Technical Adviser could attend, to hopefully continue, what was believed to be good work.

3. Brian Yates commented that Luke Howard (PCO) had also said that if the Act was agreed, the 'mystery shoppers' representing his organisation would have their own powers to issue Fixed Penalty Notices which they could not currently do, as they had to report these for prosecution. He also pointed out that it would help Spelthorne if they wrote to the Public Carriage Office. From a promotional aspect, it would be beneficial to have a local directory of taxi ranks of licensed taxi drivers or black cab drivers who were prepared to undertake these journeys. That facility could exist, but whether BAA would make the road space available was entirely another matter.
4. Cllr. Ceaser said that a local taxi tank had already previously been in existence. However, no taxi drivers were prepared to operate under this system because of the problem of the return journey.

The whole problem originated when Jack Straw MP unilaterally decided that the Metropolitan Police should only serve Greater London. Those people who previously lived a few hundred yards of the boundary, suddenly found that they were outside of the Metropolitan Police area.

If the system covered the old Metropolitan Police area, this problem would very largely go away. The Government had caused the problem. The taxi trade were in dispute and BAA were seen to be totally ineffective in not doing anything to help the situation.

It was accepted that the situation was not entirely in their hands, but it was thought that there was some action that could be taken by BAA to assist and by the London Assembly or Transport for London, bearing in mind that there was life outside of Greater London.

Terminal 5 would be on the edge of the boundary. It would be absurd if passengers were charged £50.00, £60.00 or £70.00 to travel less than 2-3 miles.

This matter had to be addressed. It was unsure if it would be the Government, Transport for London, BAA, or the taxi operators, but a solution had to be found before Terminal 5 opened in 2008, otherwise there would be anarchy.

5. As a point of information, Philip Carlisle stated that there had never been a local taxi rank in existence. The PSSC had attempted to establish one in the Central Area. There was a common taxi rank, which was called forward for each terminal. The taxi driver was then asked if he was willing to undertake a local journey. The Members had never observed a 'Fares Fair' sticker displayed on the windscreen of a taxi.

The other factor which may or may not affect the attitude of the taxi drivers was that there was a seven-day maximum period for complaints against a black cab driver. This would be extended to 30 days under the new Act, which may bring in some more complaints from overseas customers who tended to be charged the most. The passenger would have more time to report the incident from home, as opposed to the seven-days that he might be in the UK.

6. Cllr. Ceaser said he had not realised that there was a new Act going through Parliament, relating to the taxi debate.

The Technical Adviser confirmed that this was the Transport for London General Act which was before the House of Lords.

7. Ben Morton stated that the management would ensure that BAA made representation on the taxi debate at future PSSC meetings.
8. Philip Carlisle commented that it was understood if a member of staff was unable to carry out a task. However, both he and certain PSSC Members had spent time in August completing the due Terminal Monitoring Exercises as set by the Secretary. These had all been word processed and submitted on time to BAA for response.

These were no reports returned to the Committee for inclusion in the Agenda Packs for discussion at the September PSSC meeting as the member of staff who compiled these was ill. It was inconceivable that no one else at BAA could pick up the backlog and complete the documentation.

By the time that the responses to the reports were received for the next meeting, the points raised would be a dead issue.

It was at the suggestion of BAA that the format of the exercise was changed, in order to receive responses, which for the last year or two had proved very useful, as the Committee knew the problems and answers and the views of BAA. However, the current situation was disappointing.

9. The Chairman returned to the taxi debate and said that there was some progress to note.

He asked if the London Assembly were concerned on the taxi debate.

Geoff Pope replied that the London Assembly was a scrutinising body. He suggested that the Technical Adviser should put in a formal question to the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone to ask if he was aware of this issue for people living just outside of London, and how he intended to cope with it when Terminal 5 was opened in 2008.

10. Iain Hope stated that he was in support of Cllr. Ceaser on the issue of taxis. He asked why it was not possible to put forward an Amendment to the Bill which was currently going through the House of Lords and how this could be done.

The Chairman replied that BAA should produce Counsel to do this.

The Technical Adviser stated that if the Act was in the House of Lords, an Amendment could be done by a Member of the Committee looking at it or for the Lords themselves when they debated it in an Open Session.

It was suggested to Geoff Pope that if he needed any information or background on this matter, to enable him to frame a question sufficiently to put forward to Mayor Livingstone, he would be happy to provide this.

11. Cllr. Beer commented that he fully endorsed that which Cllr Ceaser had stated on the issue of taxis. He had himself lost track of time, which could be 5-8 years at which the Committee had been debating this issue, to no avail.

The impression had been given that BAA were unconcerned at the problem. They had not put resources to it. There had been no commitment extended to the Committee to solve the problem. BAA had stated on many occasions that they would address the problem, but this did not happen.

It was common knowledge that the passengers were overcharged. Cllr. Beer gave an example of a passenger being charged £54.00 from Heathrow to Old Windsor. It was considered to be licensed piracy on behalf of the taxi drivers' which had to stop.

12. The Chairman pointed out that BAA had specialists on legislation. He requested that they should be asked what they might do in relation to amending the Bill relating to the taxi debate. Ben Morton agreed to action this.

13. Cllr. Roberts pointed out that he was aware that a passenger had also been refused a fare for a short journey from Heathrow within the London area, by a black cab and was forced to return to the terminal to obtain a telephone number of a mini cab firm. Therefore, the problem of refusing a fare was not unique to outside of the London area.
14. Paul Ellis stated that it had been reported that the Mayor of London was taking powers to extend his authority on the railways outside of London. The question should be asked why he did not extend his powers to include the same across the border for taxis.
15. Paul Ellis referred to Minute 7.11 where it had been reported that Peter Bradley had attended the PSSC meeting on 26<sup>th</sup> July 2006. He had stated that by the end of the Summer (mid-late September 2006), TfL would be in a position to commence the consultation process for the bus services at Heathrow for the opening of Terminal 5.

The question was asked if the Members of the PSSC had a further update on the position, as the end of September 2006 was imminent.

The Chairman replied that the answer to this query was no, at this point.

Paul Ellis asked if the Committee could contact TfL to ask if they could provide an update.

The Technical Adviser stated that the Committee had a close liaison and regular dialogue with Peter Bradley on TfL transport matters. He has given an assurance that as soon as an agreement had been reached on the bus services for Terminal 5, he would inform the Members. The question could be put to him, but it was thought that at this stage, there was no further development to report.

#### **3074 NTK WORKING GROUP**

1. Minutes of the meeting of the Noise & Track Keeping Working Group held on 20<sup>th</sup> July 2006 had been circulated with the Agenda and were noted.
- 2.. The Technical Adviser reported that at the NTKWG meeting on 19<sup>th</sup> September 2006, the Members had discussed in some detail, the revisions of a document which had been out to Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers, dealing with Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) which kept an aircraft higher than they would otherwise be when landing at Heathrow Airport, whether they were on westerlies or easterlies.

This document had been agreed for revision and publication of this was due imminently. The distributors had undertaken to provide Members of the NTKWG and HACC with copies of the document entitled 'Arrivals Code of Practice'. Those Members who were concerned with noise and environmental matters would be interested to read the document.

## **ITEMS FOR INFORMATION**

### **3075 PLANNING APPLICATIONS**

1. Planning Applications for the Heathrow Ward of the London Borough of Hillingdon for July and August 2006 had been circulated with the Agenda and were noted.
2. John Gurney referred to the application for the Development of a Personal Rapid Transport (PRT) System. He asked if this was above or on the ground level between the N3 Car Park and Terminal 5.

Mike Forster replied that this system would run on a concrete track. It was therefore on ground level

3. John Gurney asked if an Application had been submitted for another Multi-Storey Car Park in N5 for construction in 2008.

Mike Forster said he would discuss this with John Gurney outside of the meeting.

### **3076 AIRCRAFT NOISE COMPLAINTS REPORT**

LB Richmond-upon-Thames Noise Line Figures for Quarter 2, April to June 2006 had been circulated with the Agenda and were noted.

### **3077 NEWS RELEASES**

News Releases were circulated with the Agenda for information and were noted.

### **3078 ANY OTHER BUSINESS**

1. The Chairman reported that Gareth Harper had put forward questions to ask the DfT.

1. When would the Noise Contours be published for 2005.

David Gray responded that the publication of annual Noise Contours was carried out on behalf of the DfT by the CAA's Environmental Research & Consultancy Department (ERCD).

They were currently making small adjustments to their noise models to ensure compliance with their recently published Guidance from ECAC 105 Noise Modelling. They need to produce some documentation on this reference to look at their results compared to previous versions. This had resulted in a small element of delay in publishing the details of the noise contours. However, the DfT were working with the CAA to try to complete this as soon as possible.

2. The Chairman asked if this would capture the 2004 contours as well.

David Gray responded that it was the intention that a comparative exercise could be undertaken so that once the model was up-dated, the results would be secured from the previous year. It was a correlation process.

3. There were no further items to discuss and the Chairman closed the meeting.

**DATE OF NEXT MEETING:**

**WEDNESDAY 6th DECEMBER 2006 (SEMINAR)**

**DATES OF 2007 MEETINGS:**

**WEDNESDAY 7<sup>th</sup> FEBRUARY 2007**

**WEDNESDAY 28<sup>th</sup> MARCH 2007**

**WEDNESDAY 23<sup>rd</sup> MAY 2007**

**WEDNESDAY 25<sup>th</sup> JULY 2007**

**WEDNESDAY 26<sup>th</sup> SEPTEMBER 2007**

**WEDNESDAY 5<sup>th</sup> DECEMBER 2007 (HACC SEMINAR)**

